In this is issue of the Journal of Neurosurgery, Cohen and colleagues 1 report on a systematic review of the medical and legal literature as well as media reports relating to wrong-side craniotomies. Included with their description of 35 reported cases, they have provided analysis of possible contributing factors. Not surprisingly, the most common contributing factor was a breakdown in communication. What is most striking and disconcerting is the observation that only one of the cases was reported in the peer-reviewed medical literature. A failure to recognize and discuss such events within the neurosurgical and broader medical community does nothing to prevent them. Instead, silence may actually permit these events to recur because valuable lessons learned by the hospitals and physicians involved are not shared with colleagues. This concern is not limited to neurosurgeons. Devastating events in other specialties are rarely discussed openly within our medical communities. Unfortunately, they are often broadcast widely in the public media with a laserbeam focus on the physician or the incident and issues of malpractice. This commotion and defensive posturing consume energy that would be better directed at improving processes to avoid such events.
As reflected by publication of this article, the impact of medical errors on both an individual and societal level has received increased attention over the past decade. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine report "To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System" estimated that preventable medical errors could be responsible for up to 98,000 deaths per year in the US. 5 After the IOM report, the National Quality Forum published a list of 27 preventable adverse events that should never occur in the US health care system. 8 These events were labeled as "never events." Three of the 27 never events were surgery on the wrong site/side, wrong procedure, or wrong patient. The inclusion of these dramatic and possibly catastrophic events resulted from an alert released by the Joint Commission, formerly known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, in August 1998, examining wrong site/side surgeries. 2 The alert included a review of 15 cases that had been voluntarily reported to the JC Sentinel Event system, which was established in 1995. This database was loosely fashioned on the federal aviation event reporting system in which errors or incidents that could or did influence flight safety are anonymously reported. The most recent review of the Joint Commission database updated through June 30, 2009, reveals that of the 6244 events in the database, wrong-site/side, wrong-surgery, or wrong-patient events account for the largest single category of adverse events with 837 cases (13.4%).
3 Similar to the findings in this paper, the most commonly cited contributing factor for these events was "a breakdown in communication between surgical team members and the patient and family." 3 In response to these findings, the Joint Commission issued a number of process requirements for all hospitals to implement with the goal of preventing these events. 4 As part of the National Patient Safety Goals, the Universal Protocol for preprocedural/surgical events includes performing detailed perioperative patient and procedure verification, preoperative site marking, and a preprocedural pause. Despite implementation of these safety checks in the surgical environment wrong-site/side, wrong-surgery, and wrong-patient events continue to be reported. The Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority, which mandates reporting of a broad range of medical safety incidents from all Pennsylvania health care centers, documented 76 such cases in 2008 and 12 in the first quarter of 2009. 9 In another study using multiple different databases including malpractice claims data, Seiden and Barach 11 estimated that 1300-2700 such events occur annually in the US. In an evaluation of claim records for the insurance company that covers nearly one-third of Massachusetts physicians, the rate of non-spine related wrong-site/side/patient surgery was 1 in 112,994 operations.
and insurers are often quick to negotiate away these errors to avoid publicity or jury verdicts with restrictions preventing the public release of information. This leads to a lack of understanding regarding the many potential causes of these wrong-side surgeries, which could be used to educate providers and improve systems in the hope of avoiding repetition of these errors in other patients.
With these sobering statistics, a number of questions arise. Why do these errors continue to occur? Why have seemingly reasonable and redundant safety measures failed to prevent them? Is this just human error or system failure? Can these events really be prevented? Cohen and colleagues have discussed a multitude of factors that contributed to these wrong-side craniotomies including a broad range of communication failures, technological issues, organizational problems, and unfortunately clear provider errors. Can processes be developed and implemented to prevent these errors from occurring in all neurosurgical procedures or, for that matter, in all surgical procedures performed in the US? The data would suggest that this is highly unlikely.
Perrow 10 noted in his classic analysis of failures in high reliability organizations, such as the nuclear power and aviation industry and the US space agency, that as systems become more complex, both from a technological and organizational point of view, with more interdependent units failure should be considered as a "normal" process. The conclusions from his analysis led to titling his report "Normal Accidents," which indicates that these events are going to be inherently part of our ever increasingly complex systems. As in other high reliability organizations, health care providers are increasingly working in an extremely complex, dynamic, and interdependent system. These people no longer possess all the required information about the system to safely monitor it. Unfortunately, this allows seemingly small errors or failures to propagate through the system and can lead to catastrophic outcomes such as those reported here.
Assuming that an easy system fix is impossible, what can a surgeon do to minimize the risk of these events? As described by Cohen et al., 1 the most important first step that we as surgeons can take to avoid these events is to communicate. Communicate early, frequently, and with as many people, including the patient, as possible leading up to an operation. Never assume that any individual, including the surgeon, has all the answers. Second, be open to inquiry from care team providers around you and actively listen as others might have vital information. This type of exchange is the rationale behind the preoperative team briefing being advocated by some organizations. The use of a preoperative team briefing as well as active preprocedural referencing of imaging data, consent forms, and consultation notes are steps that permit the exchange of additional information or questioning of unclear information. In a study by Makary et al., 7 the authors demonstrated that a team briefing significantly improved the team's perception of reducing the potential for a wrongsite/surgery/person event. Third, never assume that the radiographs being used for surgery are correctly labeled or interpreted. If possible, the neurosurgeon should try to access and review the source images to confirm laterality. It is naive to assume that images are automatically labeled correctly by the computer because at some point human input into laterality is required.
In conclusion, the article by Cohen and colleagues 1 joins a growing body of medical literature that discusses our failures at providing the very best care for our patients. Their intent is to educate us all, not to cast blame. Without a doubt, these are extremely tragic events for the patients, their families, and the providers involved. However, not rigorously reporting, analyzing, and sharing these events with the broader medical community compounds the tragedy for we are prevented from learning and avoiding a repetition of these tragic errors.
could not report because of various nondisclosure agreements, which goes to the very heart of the editorial comments, and underscores their importance and relevance. Neither did we include some of the more novel and creative methods for reducing these "never events." One such method is for every hospital to designate one individual as a "Correct Side Surgery Officer". This person's only job and responsibility is to check and verify patient identity, type of operation, laterality, consent, and surgeon for every single procedure and operation that is performed at that facility. 1 Before implementing such personnel-intensive prevention systems, universal attempts should be made to adhere to currently accepted safeguards. In our review, nearly half of the cases involved inadequate preoperative checks including basic surgical time-outs, which have gained increasing acceptance as standard protocols for preventing wrong-site surgery.
We must all work harder to not only avoid such errors, but to create a culture where it is as safe as possible to discuss them openly.
